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Abstract
We study the query complexity of Bayesian Private Learning: a learner
wishes to locate a random target within an interval by submitting queries,
in the presence of an adversary who observes all of her queries but not the
responses. How many queries are necessary and sufficient in order for the
learner to accurately estimate the target, while simultaneously concealing the
target from the adversary?
Our main result is a query complexity lower bound that is tight up to the
first order. We show that if the learner wants to estimate the target within an
error of ε, while ensuring that no adversary estimator can achieve a constant
additive error with probability greater than 1{L, then the query complexity is
on the order of L logp1{εq, as ε Ñ 0. Our result demonstrates that increased
privacy, as captured by L, comes at the expense of a multiplicative increase in
query complexity.
Our proof method builds on Fano’s inequality and a family of proportional-
sampling estimators. As an illustration of the method’s wider applicability, we
generalize the complexity lower bound to settings involving high-dimensional
linear query learning and partial adversary observation.1
Keywords : private active learning, goal-oriented privacy, action-information
proximity, stochastic systems.
1 Introduction
How to learn, while ensuring that a spying adversary does not learn? Enabled by
rapid advancements in the Internet, surveillance technologies and machine learning,
companies or governments alike have become increasingly capable of monitoring the
behavior of individuals, consumers and competitors, and use such data for inference
and prediction. Motivated by these developments, the present paper investigates the
extent to which it is possible for a learner to protect her knowledge from an adversary
who observes, completely or partially, her actions. Furthermore, we are interested
1This version: October 2019. A preliminary version appeared in the proceedings of the Confer-
ence on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS), December 2018 (Xu, 2018).
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in how much additional effort is required for the learner to retain such privacy,
and conversely, from the adversary’s perspective, what kinds of statistical inference
algorithms are most effective against a potentially privacy-conscious subject.
Concretely, we approach these questions by studying the query complexity of
Bayesian Private Learning, a framework proposed by Xu (2017) and Tsitsiklis et al.
(2018) to investigate the privacy-efficiency trade-off in active learning. Our main
result is a tight lower bound on query complexity, showing that there will be a price
to pay for the learner in exchange for improved privacy, whose magnitude scales
multiplicatively with respect to the level of privacy desired. In addition, we provide
a family of inference algorithms for the adversary, based on proportional sampling,
which is provably effective in estimating the target against any learner who does not
employ a large number of queries.
Among our chief motivations are applications that involve protecting the privacy
of consumers or firms against increasingly powerful surveillance and data analysis
technologies; these applications are discussed in Section 3.
1.1 The Model: Bayesian Private Learning
We begin by describing the Bayesian Private Learning model formulated by Xu
(2017) and Tsitsiklis et al. (2018). A learner is trying to accurately identify the
location of a random target, X˚, up to some constant additive error, ε, where X˚
is uniformly distributed in the unit interval, r0, 1q. The learner gathers information
about X˚ by submitting n queries
pQ1, . . . , Qnq P r0, 1qn, (1)
for some n P N. For each query, Qi, she receives a binary response, indicating the
target’s location relative to the query:
Ri “ IpX˚ ď Qiq, i “ 1, 2, . . . , n, (2)
where Ip¨q denotes the indicator function. Viewed from the angle of optimization,
the target can be thought of as the minimum of a convex function with unknown
parameters, and the responses will correspond to the signs of the function’s gradients
at the queried points.
The learner submits the queries in a sequential manner, and subsequent queries
may depend on previous responses. Once all n queries are submitted, the learner
will produce an estimator for the target. The learner’s behavior is formally captured
by a learner strategy, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Learner Strategy) Fix n P N. Let Y be a uniform random vari-
able over r0, 1q, independent from other parts of the system; Y will be referred to as
the random seed. A learner strategy, φ “ pφq, φlq, consists of two components:
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1. Querying mechanism: φq “ pφq
1
, . . . , φ
q
nq, is a sequence of deterministic func-
tions, where φqi : r0, 1qi´1 ˆ r0, 1q Ñ r0, 1q takes as input past responses and
the random seed, Y , and generates the next query, i.e.,2
Qi “ φqi pRi´1, Y q, i “ 1, . . . , n, (3)
where Ri denotes the responses from the first i queries: Ri “ pR1, . . . , Riq,
and R0
△“ H.
2. Estimator: φl : r0, 1qnˆr0, 1q Ñ r0, 1q is a deterministic function that maps all
responses, Rn, and Y to a point in the unit interval that serves as a “guess”
for X˚: pX “ φlpRn, Y q. (4)pX will be referred to as the learner estimator.
We will use Φn to denote the family of learner strategies that submit n queries.
The first objective of the learner is to accurately estimate the target, as is for-
malized in the following definition.
Definition 2 (ε-Accuracy) Fix ε P p0, 1q. A learner strategy, φ, is ε-accurate, if
its estimator approximates the target within an absolutely error of ε{2 almost surely,
i.e.,
P
´ˇˇˇ pX ´X˚ ˇˇˇ ď ε{2¯ “ 1, (5)
where the probability is measured with respect to the randomness in the target, X˚,
and the random seed, Y .
We now introduce the notion of privacy : in addition to estimating X˚, the
learner would like to simultaneously conceal X˚ from an eavesdropping adversary.
Specifically, there is an adversary who knows the learner’s query strategy, and ob-
serves all of the queries but not the responses. The adversary then uses the query
locations to generate her own adversary estimator for X˚, denoted by pXa, which
depends on the queries, pQ1, . . . , Qnq, and any internal, idiosyncratic randomness.
With the adversary’s presence in mind, we define the notion of a private learner
strategy.
Definition 3 (pδ, Lq-Privacy) Fix δ P p0, 1q and L P N. A learner strategy, φ, is
pδ, Lq-private if, for any adversary estimator, pXa,
Pp| pXa ´X˚| ď δ{2q ď 1{L, (6)
2Note that the query Qi does not explicitly depend on previous queries, tQ1, . . . , Qi´1u, but
only their responses. This is without the loss of generality, since for a given value of Y it is easy
to see that tQ1, . . . , Qi´1u can be reconstructed once we know their responses and the functions
φ
q
1
, . . . , φqn.
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where the probability is measured with respect to the randomness in the target, X˚,
and any randomness employed by the learner strategy and the adversary estimator.3
In particular, if a learner employs a pδ, Lq-private strategy, then no adversary
estimator can be close to the target within an absolute error of δ{2 with a probability
great than 1{L. Therefore, for any fixed δ, the parameter L can be interpreted as
the level of desired privacy.
We are now ready to define the main quantity of interest in this paper: query
complexity.
Definition 4 Fix ε and δ in r0, 1s, and L P N. The query complexity, Npε, δ, Lq,
is the least number of queries needed for an ε-accurate learner strategy to be pδ, Lq-
private:
Npε, δ, Lq △“ mintn : Φn contains a strategy that is both ε-accurate and pδ, Lq-privateu.
Remark 1 (Connections to Active Learning) Cast in the terminology of ac-
tive learning, the problem facing the learner is equivalent to that of learning a thresh-
old function, fX˚p¨q, with the threshold X˚: fX˚pxq “ IpX˚ ď xq, x P r0, 1q. The
response Ri is simply the value of the function evaluated at Qi: fX˚pQiq. A learner
strategy is ε-accurate if the leaner is able to produce a threshold function fˆ such that
}fˆ ´ fX˚}1 △“
ş
xPp0,1s |fˆpxq ´ fX˚pxq|dx ď ε{2.
1.2 Notation and Convention
We will use the asymptotic notation fpxq „ gpxq to mean that f is on the order of g:
fpxq{gpxq Ñ 1 as x approaches a certain limit. All logarithmic functions used in this
paper will be with base 2. To avoid excessive use of floors and ceilings, we will assume
the values of ε, δ and 1{L are integral powers of 1{2, so that their corresponding
logarithmic expressions always assume an integral value. When referring to an
interval that belongs to a partition of r0, 1q, we will use the term “sub-interval” to
distinguish it from the unit interval itself; the same is true with the term “sub-cube”
in higher dimensions. We use x _ y and x ^ y as a short-hand for maxtx, yu and
mintx, yu, respectively.
2 Main Result
The main objective of the paper is to understand how Npε, δ, Lq varies as a function
of the input parameters, ε, δ and L. Our result will focus on the regime of parameters
where
0 ă ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L. (7)
3This definition of privacy is reminiscent of the error metric used in Probably Approximately
Correct (PAC) learning (Valiant, 1984), if we view the adversary as trying to learn a (trivial)
constant function to within an L1 error of δ{2 with a probability great than 1{L.
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Having ε ă 1
4
δ corresponds to a setting where the learner would like to identify
the target with high accuracy, while the adversary is aiming for a coarser estimate;
the specific constant 1
4
is likely an artifact of our analysis and could potentially be
improved to being closer to 1. Note that the regime where ε ą δ is arguably much
less interesting, because it is not natural to expect the adversary, who is not engaged
in the querying process, to have a higher accuracy requirement than the learner. The
requirement that δ ă 1{L stems from the following argument. If δ ą 1{L, then the
adversary can simply draw a point uniformly at random in r0, 1q and be guaranteed
that the target will be within δ{2 with a probability greater than 1{L. Thus, the
privacy constraint is automatically violated, and no private learner strategy exists.
To obtain a nontrivial problem, we therefore need only to consider the case where
δ ă 1{L.
The following theorem is our main result. The upper bound has appeared in Xu
(2017) and Tsitsiklis et al. (2018) and is included for completeness; the lower bound
is the contribution of the present paper.
Theorem 1 (Query Complexity of Bayesian Private Learning) Fix ε and δ
in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L. The following is true.
1. Upper bound:
Npε, δ, Lq ď L logp1{εq ´ LplogL´ 1q ´ 1. (8)
2. Lower bound:
Npε, δ, Lq ě L logp1{εq ´ L logp2{δq ´ 3L log logpδ{εq. (9)
Both the upper and lower bounds in Theorem 1 are constructive, in the sense that
we will describe a concrete learner strategy that achieves the upper bound, and an
adversary estimator that forces any learner strategy to employ at least as many
queries as that prescribed by the lower bound.
If we apply Theorem 1 in the regime where δ and L stay fixed, while the learner’s
error tolerance, ε, tends to zero, we obtain the following corollary in which the upper
and lower bounds on query complexity coincide.
Corollary 1 Fix δ P p0, 1q and L P N, such that δ ă 1{L. Then,
Npε, δ, Lq „ L logp1{εq, as εÑ 0. (10)
Note that the special case of L “ 1 corresponds to when the learner is not
privacy-constrained and aims to solely minimize the number of queries. Theorem 1
and Corollary 1 thus demonstrate that there is a hefty price to pay in exchange for
privacy, as the query complexity depends multiplicatively on the level of privacy, L.
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Deriving the query complexity formulae in Theorem 1 is not the only objective
of our inquiry. As will become clearer, the proof of Theorem 1 will lead us to
discovering the surprising efficacy of certain, seemingly naive, adversary estimators
based on proportional sampling, and through them, we will obtain new insights
into the problem’s strategic dynamics. Consequently, we will be able to better
answer questions such as: what are the key features that make it hard to conceal
(learned) information in a sequential learning problem? How should the adversary
take advantage of these features when designing inference algorithms? A key concept
along this direction, that of information-action locality, will be further explored in
Section 8.1.
Remark 2 (Noisy vs. Noiseless Responses) Our model assumes that the re-
sponses, Ri, are exact (Eq. (2)), in contrast to some of the noisy response models in
the literature (e.g., Rivest et al., 1980; Ben-Or and Hassidim, 2008; Waeber et al.,
2013), where, for instance, the true responses are flipped with a positive probabil-
ity. We observe that the query complexity lower bound in Theorem 1 automatically
applies to the noisy setting (because a learner’s strategy can simulate noisy query
responses by artificially perturbing the true responses), while the upper bound doesn’t
(because it would require a different set of private learner strategies). We focus on
the noiseless model because it is an important baseline that allows us to streamline
the analysis and brings to the fore key insights. That being said, generalizing our
results to a noisy query model can be an interesting and practically relevant direction
of future research; it is discussed further in Section 9.
3 Motivating Applications
While our model is stylized, it is designed to capture fundamental privacy vs. com-
plexity tradeoffs inherent in applications of sequential learning. We examine below
two such motivating applications:
Example 1: Protecting consumer privacy. Consider a consumer (the
learner) who is browsing an online retailer site in search of an item with an “ideal”
one-dimensional feature value (the target), such as its size, brightness, or color tone.
While the consumer does not directly know what the ideal value is, when presented
with an item, she is able to articulate the “impression” as to whether the current
item’s feature value is too large or to small. Guided by these impressions, the con-
sumer browses different items in a sequential manner to eventually narrow down the
ideal item. During this process, the online retailer observes all of the items viewed
by the consumer along with their feature values, but does not know the impressions
perceived by the consumer. Can the consumer conduct the search in such a way
that does not reveal to the retailer the ideal item that she ultimately intends to
purchase? (One can imagine that such information would put the consumer in a
disadvantageous position for various reasons.) How many additional items should
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the consumer browse, and in what manner, should she wish to achieve successful
obfuscation against the retailer’s inference algorithms?
Example 2: Privacy-aware price learning (Tsitsiklis et al. (2018)). Con-
sider a firm (the learner) is in the process of launching a new product, and would
like to price the product in a way that maximizes total profit. The profit, fppq,
is a concave function of the price, p, and since the parameters of f are unknown,
the firm believes the profit maximizing price, p˚ “ argmaxp fppq, to be uniformly
distributed in a certain interval, I. To identify p˚ (corresponding to the target),
the firm proceeds to test the sensitivity of the profit function at a sequence of price
points pQ1, . . . , Qnq P In using costly surveys or experiments; the test prices cor-
respond to the queries and the resulting sensitivities the responses. Because the
testing prices may be easily obtained or even public, the firm is concerned that a
competitor (the adversary) who observes the testing prices will be able to predict
p˚ and price their competing products accordingly, which would be detrimental to
the firm. The firm would thus like to minimize the number of testing prices, while
ensuring that p˚ remains unpredictable for the competitors.
Finally, let us be reminded that Bayesian Private Learning is a more general
model that contains, as a special case (L “ 1), the classical problem of sequen-
tial learning with binary feedback. The latter has a wide range of applications
in statistics (Robbins and Monro, 1951), information theory (Horstein, 1963) and
optimization (Waeber et al., 2013), and as a more general model Bayesian Private
Learning inherits these applications as well.
4 Related Literature
Bayesian Private Learning is a variant of the so-called Private Sequential Learning
problem. Both models were formulated in Xu (2017) and Tsitsiklis et al. (2018),
and the main distinction between the two is that the target is drawn randomly
in Bayesian Private Learning, while it is chosen in a worst-case fashion (against
the adversary) in the original Private Sequential Learning model. Xu (2017) and
Tsitsiklis et al. (2018) establish matching upper and lower bounds on query com-
plexity for Private Sequential Learning. They also propose the Replicated Bisection
algorithm as a learner strategy for the Bayesian variant, but without a matching
query complexity lower bound. The present paper closes this gap.
The two formulations indeed differ in crucial ways. The worst-case assumption
in the original model imposes a more stringent criterion for the adversary: she would
have to ensure a certain probability of correct estimation for any realization of the
target (more risk-averse). In contrast, the adversary in the Bayesian version only
has to do so on average (more risk-neutral). This distinction further leads to very
different query complexities: the query complexity in the worst-case formulation
was shown to be around logpδ{εq`2L (Xu, 2017; Tsitsiklis et al., 2018), whereas we
show that the query complexity in the Bayesian setting is approximately L logpδ{εq
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(Theorem 1). That is, the privacy requirement demands significantly greater efforts
from the learner in the Bayesian version, from being additive to multiplicative in the
level of privacy, L. Finally, the proof techniques for establishing lower bounds in the
two settings also diverge: the arguments employed by Xu (2017) and Tsitsiklis et al.
(2018) are combinatorial in nature, whereas our proof relies on information-theoretic
tools.
At a higher level, our work is connected to a growing body of literature on
privacy-preserving mechanisms, in computer science (Dwork et al., 2014; Lindell and Pinkas,
2009; Fanti et al., 2015), operations research (Cummings et al., 2016; Tsitsiklis and Xu,
2018), and statistical learning theory (Chaudhuri et al., 2011; Jain et al., 2012;
Wainwright et al., 2012). Beyond the more obvious divergence in models and appli-
cations, we highlight below some conceptual differences between Bayesian Private
Learning and the extant literature.
1. Goal-Oriented vs. Universal : this is the most distinguishing feature of our
privacy framework. Our notion of privacy is goal-oriented, defined with respect to
the adversary’s (in)ability to perform a specific statistical inference task. Notably,
this is in contrast to the (much more stringent) universal privacy criteria, among
which Differential Privacy (e.g., Dwork et al., 2014) is a well-known paradigm, where
the output distribution of a mechanism is supposed to be insensitive with respect to
any perturbation in the input, and hence preventing an adversary from performing
any inference task. A key consequence of the context-dependent formulation is that
the decision strategy can be tailored to the adversary’s inference task, and hence
more efficient; in contrast, universal private requires the system designer to defend
against a wider range of possible adversaries, and thus restricts the designer to using
only conservative and inefficient strategies. The difference between the context-
dependent and universal privacy is further explored in Appendix B: we show that
an pδ, Lq-private Replicated Bisection strategy is never differentially private, thus
demonstrating that the latter is a strictly more restricting privacy criterion.
2. Concealing the Unknown vs. the Known: the object to be concealed in our
model is initially unknown even to the decision maker herself, and must be actively
learned. This is in contrast to privacy models where the decision maker knows in
advance the information to be concealed: examples of such information include the
rumor source in the anonymous rumor spreading problem of Fanti et al. (2015), or
the goal vertex in the Goal Prediction game of Tsitsiklis and Xu (2018).
3. Sequential vs. One-shot : we focus on sequential and dynamic learning, as
opposed to one-shot or static problems (e.g., Gupta et al., 2012).
4. Decision-centric vs. Data-centric: we focus on the behavior and actions of a
privacy-aware decision maker, as opposed to anonymizing a data set (Gasarch, 2004;
Dwork, 2008; Gupta et al., 2012). The obfuscation measures in a decision problem
can be significantly more limited than those in privatizing a data set: one is only
able to modify which actions are chosen and not how they are observed, whereas a
data release algorithm could inject richer noises or fudge data entries. This is an
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inherent byproduct of the fact that the decision maker often has to use the actions as
a means to acquire information or achieve a goal, and sometimes reveals the actions
directly to the adversary (e.g., a search engine or data provider), rendering injecting
arbitrary noise virtually impossible.
On the methodological front, our proof uses Fano’s inequality, an essential tool
for deriving lower bounds in statistics, information theory, and active learning
(Cover and Thomas, 2006). The proportional sampling estimators that we analyze
are reminiscent of the reward-matching policy studied by Xu and Yun (2018) and,
more broadly, the so-called Luce’s rule in reinforcement learning (Luce, 1959), where
actions are chosen with probabilities proportional to the amount of associated re-
wards; these policies are known to perform well in repeated games (Erev and Roth,
1998). However, to the best of our knowledge, both proportional-sampling estima-
tors and the use of Fano’s inequality have received relatively little attention in the
context of private sequential learning.
Finally, we remark that recently, building on the conference version of the present
manuscript (Xu, 2018), the authors of Xu and Yang (2019) were able to use more
intricate analysis and a variant of the proportional sampling estimator proposed in
this paper, which they termed the truncated proportional sampling estimator, to
established a pair of improved query complexity upper and lower bounds that are
tight up to an additive factor of OpLq.
5 Proof Overview
The next two sections are devoted to the proof of Theorem 1. We first give an
overview of the main ideas. Let us begin by considering the special case of L “ 1,
where learner is solely interested in finding the target, X˚, and not at all concerned
with concealing it from the adversary. Here, the problem reduces to the classical
setting, where it is well-known that the bisection strategy achieves the optimal
query complexity (Waeber et al., 2013). The bisection strategy recursively queries
the mid-point of the interval which the learner knows to contain X˚. For instance,
the learner would set Q1 “ 1{2, and if the response R1 “ 0, then she will know that
X˚ lies in the interval r0, 1{2s, and set Q2 to 1{4; otherwise, Q2 will be set to 3{4.
This process repeats for n steps. Because the size of the smallest interval known to
contain X˚ is halved with each additional query, this yields the query complexity
Npε, δ, 1q “ logp1{εq, ε P p0, 1q. (11)
Unfortunately, once the level of privacy L increases above 1, the bisection strat-
egy is almost never private: it is easy to verify that if the adversary sets pXa to be
the learner’s last query, Qn, then the target is sure to be within a distance of at
most ε. That is, the bisection strategy is not pδ, Lq-private for any L ą 1, whenever
ε ă δ{2. This is hardly surprising: in the quest for efficiency, the bisection strat-
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egy submits queries that become progressively closer to the target, thus rending its
location obvious to the adversary.
Building on the bisection strategy, we arrive at a natural compromise: instead
of a single bisection search over the entire unit interval, we could create L identical
copies of a bisection search across L disjoint sub-intervals of r0, 1q that are chosen
ahead of time, in a manner that makes it impossible to distinguish which search is
truly looking for the target. This is the main idea behind the Replicated Bisection
strategy, first proposed and analyzed in Tsitsiklis et al. (2018). We examine this
strategy in Section 6, which will yield the query-complexity upper bound, on the
order of L logp1{εq.
Proving the lower bound turns out to be more challenging. To show that the
query complexity is at least, say, n, we will have to demonstrate that none of the
learner strategies using n ´ 1 queries, Φn´1, can be simultaneously private and
accurate. Because the sufficient statistic for the adversary to perform estimation is
the posterior distribution of the target given the observed queries, a frontal assault
on the problem would require that we characterize the resulting target posterior
distribution for all strategies, a daunting task given the richness of Φn´1, which
grows rapidly as n increases.
Our proof will take an indirect approach. The key idea is that, instead of al-
lowing the adversary to use the entire posterior distribution of the target, we may
restrict her to a seemingly much weaker class of proportional-sampling estimators,
where the estimator pXa is sampled from a distribution proportional to the empir-
ical density of the queries. A proportional-sampling estimator would, for instance,
completely ignore the order in which the queries are submitted, which may contain
useful information about the target. We will show that, perhaps surprisingly, the
proportional-estimators are so powerful that they leave the learner no option but to
use a large number of samples. This forms the core of the lower bound argument.
Studying the proportional-sampling estimators has additional benefits. From
a practical perspective, they are constructive estimators that are extremely easy
to implement and yet guaranteed to provide good estimation accuracy against any
learner strategy that uses few queries. More importantly, their structure avails us
with deeper insights into a fundamental dilemma the learner faces: in order to ac-
quire a sufficient amount of information to locate the target accurately, a significant
portion of the learner’s actions (queries) must be spatially close to the said target.
It is precisely this action-information proximity that the proportional-sampling esti-
mator exploits. The concept of action-information proximity will be explored more
in depth in Section 8.1.
The proof of the lower bound will be presented in Section 7, consisting of the
following steps.
1. Discrete Private Learning (Section 7.1). We formulate a discrete version of
the original problem where both the learner and adversary estimate the discrete
index associated with a certain sub-interval that contains the target, instead of the
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continuous target value. The discrete framework is conceptually clearer, and will
allow us to deploy information-theoretic tools with greater ease.
2. Localized Query Complexity (Section 7.2). Within the discrete version, we
prove a localized query complexity result: conditioning on the target being in a
coarse sub-interval of r0, 1q, any accurate learner still needs to submit a large num-
ber of queries within the said sub-interval. The main argument hinges on Fano’s
inequality and a characterization of the conditional entropy of the queries and the
target.
3. Proportional-Sampling Estimator (Section 8.1). We use the localized query
complexity in the previous step to prove a query complexity lower bound for the
discrete version of Bayesian Private Learning. This is accomplished by analyzing the
performance of the family of proportional-sampling estimators, where the adversary
reports index of a sub-interval that is sampled randomly with probabilities propor-
tional to the number of learner queries each sub-interval contains. We will show
that the proportional-sampling estimator will succeed with overwhelming probabil-
ity whenever an accurate learner strategy submits too few queries, thus obtaining
the desired lower bound. In fact, we will prove a more general lower bound, where
the learner can make mistakes with a positive probability.
4. From Discrete to Continuous (Section 7.4). We complete the proof by con-
necting the discrete version back to the original, continuous problem. Via a reduc-
tion argument, we show that the original query complexity is always bounded from
below by its discrete counterpart with some modified learner error parameters, and
the final lower bound will be obtained by optimizing over these parameters. The
main difficulty in this portion of the proof is due to the fact that an accurate contin-
uous learner estimator is insufficient for generating an accurate discrete estimator
that is correct almost surely. We will resolve this problem by carefully bounding the
learner’s probability of estimation error, and apply the discrete query lower bound
developed in the previous step, in which the learner is allowed to make mistakes.
6 The Upper Bound
We prove the upper bound of Theorem 1. The bound has appeared in Xu (2017)
and Tsitsiklis et al. (2018), which proposed, without a formal proof, the Replicated
Bisection learner strategy that achieves pδ, Lq-privacy with L logp1{εq´LplogpLq´1q
queries. For completeness, we first review the Replicated Bisection strategy and
subsequently give a formal proof of its privacy and accuracy. The main idea behind
Replicated Bisection is to create L identical copies of a bisection search in a strictly
symmetrical manner so that the adversary wouldn’t be able to know which one of
the L searches is associated with the target. The strategy takes as initial inputs ε
and L, and proceeds in two phases:
1. Phase 1 - Non-adaptive Partitioning. The learner submits L´1 (non-adaptive)
11
Replicated Bisection (Phase 2)
l˚ Ð the index of I˚, K Ð log ` 1
Lε
˘
, D0 Ð 12L
for k :“ 0 to K ´ 1 do
begin
for l :“ 0 to L´ 1 do
Qpk`1qL`l Ð pl ´ 1q 1L `Dk
if Rpk`1qL`l˚ “ 0 (i.e., X˚ ą Qpk`1qL`l˚) then
Dk`1 Ð Dk ` 1L
`
1
2
˘k
else
Dk`1 Ð Dk ´ 1L
`
1
2
˘k
end
Figure 1: Pseudo-code for Phase 2 of the Replicated Bisection strategy. Dk repre-
sents the distance from a query submitted in the kth round to the left end-point of
its corresponding sub-interval.
queries:
Q1 “ 1
L
, Q2 “ 2
L
, . . . , QL´1 “ 1´ 1
L
, (12)
Adjacent queries are separated by a distant of 1{L, and together they partition
the unit interval into L disjoint sub-intervals of length 1{L each. We will refer
to the interval rpi ´ 1q{L, i{Lq as the ith sub-interval. Because the queries in
this phase are non-adaptive, after the first L ´ 1 queries, while the learner
knows which sub-interval contains the target, X˚, the adversary has gained
no information about X˚. We will denote by I˚ the sub-interval that contains
X.
2. Phase 2 - Replicated Bisection. The second phase further consists of a sequence
of Krounds, K “ log ` 1
Lε
˘
. In each round, the learner submits one query in
each of the L sub-intervals, and the location of the said query relative to the
left end of the sub-interval is the same across all sub-intervals. Crucially, in the
kth round, the query corresponds to the kth step in a bisection search carried
out in the sub-interval I˚, which contains the target. The rounds continue
until the learner has identified the location of X˚ with sufficient accuracy
within I˚. The queries outside of I˚ serve only the purpose of obfuscation by
maintaining a strict symmetry. Figure 1 contains the pseudo-code for Phase
2.
Denote by Q˚ the last query that the learner submits in the sub-interval I˚ in
Phase 2, and by R˚ its response. It follows by construction that either R˚ “ 0
and X˚ P rQ˚ ´ ε,Q˚q, or R˚ “ 1 and X˚ P rQ˚, Q˚ ` εq. Therefore, the learner
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can produce the estimator by setting pX to the mid point of either rQ˚ ´ ε,Q˚q
or rQ˚, Q˚ ` εq, depending on the value of R˚, and this guarantees of an additive
error of at most ε{2. We have thus shown that the Replicated Bisection strategy is
ε-accurate. The following result shows that it is also private; the proof is given in
Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 Fix ε and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L.
The Replicated Bisection strategy is pδ, Lq-private.
Finally, we verify the number of queries used by Replicated Bisection: the first
phase employs L´ 1 queries, and the second phase uses L queries per round, across
logp 1
Lε
q rounds, leading to a total of pL´1q`L logp 1
Lε
q “ L logp1{εq´Lplog L´1q´1
queries. This completes the proof of the query complexity upper bound in Theorem
1.
7 The Lower Bound
We prove the query complexity lower bound in Theorem 1 in this section. An
overview of the main steps can be found in Section 5.
7.1 Discrete Bayesian Private Learning
We begin by formulating a discrete version of the original problem, where the goal
for both the learner and the adversary is to recover a discrete index associated with
the target, as opposed to generating a continuous estimator. We first create two
nested partitions of the unit interval consisting of equal-length sub-intervals, where
one partition is coarser than the other. The objective of the learner is to recover the
index associated with the sub-interval containing X˚ in the finer partition, whereas
that of the adversary is to recover the target’s index corresponding to the coarser
partition (an easier task!). We consider this discrete formulation because it allows
for a simpler analysis using Fano’s inequality, setting the stage for the localized
query complexity lower bound in the next section.
Formally, fix s P p0, 1q such that 1{s is an integer. Define Mipsq to be the
sub-interval
Mspiq “ rpi ´ 1qs, isq, i “ 1, 2, . . . , 1{s. (13)
In particular, the set Ms :“ tMspiq : i “ 1, . . . , 1{su is a partition of r0, 1q into
1{s sub-intervals of length s each. We will refer to Ms as the s-uniform partition.
Define
Jps, xq “ j, s.t. x PMspjq. (14)
That is, Jps, xq denotes the indices of the interval containing x in the s-uniform
partition. A visualization of the index Jp¨, ¨q is given in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: An example of the indices Jp¨,X˚q. Here, δ “ 0.2 and ε “ 0.1, and the
target X˚ “ 0.15. The target thus belongs to the first sub-interval in a δ-uniform
partition, and the second sub-interval in an ε-uniform partition. We have that
Jpδ,X˚q “ 1 and Jpε,X˚q “ 2.
We now formulate an analogous, and slightly more general, definition of accuracy
and privacy for the discrete problem. We will use the super-script D to distinguish
them from their counterparts in the original, continuous formulation. Just like the
learner strategy in Definition 1, a discrete learner strategy, φD, is allowed to submit
queries at any point along r0, 1q, and has access to the random seed, Y . The only
difference is that, instead of generating a continuous estimator, a discrete learner
strategy produces an estimator for the index of the sub-interval containing the target
in an ε-uniform partition, Jpε,X˚q.
Definition 5 (pε, νq-accuracy - Discrete Version) Fix ε and ν P p0, 1q. A dis-
crete learner strategy, φD, is pε, νq-accurate if it produces an estimator, pJ , such
that
P
´ pJ ‰ Jpε,X˚q¯ ď ν. (15)
Importantly, in contrast to its continuous counterpart in Definition 2 where the
estimator must satisfy the error criterion with probability one, the discrete learner
strategy is allowed to make mistakes up to a probability of ν.
The role of adversary is similarly defined in the discrete formulation: upon
observing all n queries, the adversary generates an estimator, pJa, for the index
associated with the sub-interval containing X˚ in the (coarser) δ-uniform partition,
Jpδ,X˚q. The notion of pδ, Lq-privacy for a discrete learner strategy is defined in
terms of the adversary’s (in)ability to estimate the index Jpδ,X˚q.
Definition 6 (pδ, Lq-privacy - Discrete Version) Fix δ P p0, 1q and L P N. A
discrete learner strategy, φD, is pδ, Lq-private if under any adversary estimator pJa,
we have that
P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q¯ ď 1{L. (16)
We will denote by ΦDn as the family of discrete learner strategies that employ at most
n queries.
We are now ready to define the query complexity of the discrete formulation, as
follows:
NDpε, ν, δ, Lq “ mintn : ΦDn contains a strategy that is both pε, νq-accurate and pδ, Lq-privateu.
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A main result of this subsection is the following lower bound on ND, which we will
convert into one for the original problem in Section 7.4.
Proposition 2 (Query Complexity Lower Bound for Discrete Learner Strategies)
Fix ε, ν and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ ă 1{L. We have that
NDpε, ν, δ, Lq ě L rp1´ νq logpδ{εq ´ hpνqs , (17)
where hppq is the Shannon entropy of a Bernoulli random variable with mean p:
hppq “ ´p logppq ´ p1´ pq logp1´ pq for p P p0, 1q, and hp0q “ hp1q “ 0.
7.2 Localized Query Complexity Lower Bound
We prove Proposition 2 in the next two subsections. The first step, accomplished in
the present subsection, is to use Fano’s inequality to establish a query complexity
lower bound localized to a sub-interval: conditional on the target belonging to a
sub-interval in the δ-partition, any discrete-learner strategy must devote a non-
trivial number of queries in that sub-interval if it wishes to be reasonably accurate.
Since all learner strategies considered in the next two subsections will be for the
discrete problem, we will refer to them simply as learner strategies when there is no
ambiguity.
Fix n P N, and a learner strategy φD P ΦDn . Because the strategy will submit
at most n queries, without loss of generality, we may assume that if the learner
wishes to terminate the process after the first K queries, then she will simply set
Qi to 0 for all i P tK ` 1,K ` 2, . . . , nu, and the responses for those queries will be
trivially equal to 0 almost surely. Denote by Qj the set of queries that lie within
the sub-interval Mδpjq:
Qj
△“ tQi, . . . , Qnu XMδpjq, (18)
and by |Qj | its cardinality. Denote by Rj the set of responses for those queries in
Qj . Define ξj,y to be the learner’s (conditional) probability of error:
ξj,y “ P
´ pJ ‰ Jpε,X˚q ˇˇ Jpδ,X˚q “ j, Y “ y¯ , j P t1, . . . , 1{δu, y P r0, 1q. (19)
We have the following lemma. The proof is based on Fano’s inequality.
Lemma 1 (Localized Query Complexity) Fix ε, ν and δ P p0, 1q, ε ă δ, and
an pε, νq-accurate discrete learner strategy. We have that
E
`|Qj | ˇˇJpδ,X˚q “ j, Y “ y˘ ě p1´ ξj,yq logpδ{εq ´ hpξj,yq, (20)
for all j P t1, . . . , 1{δu, and y P r0, 1q, and
1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
ξi,y dy ď ν. (21)
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Proof.Denote by Ej,y the event:
Ej,y “ tJpδ,X˚q “ j, Y “ yu. (22)
Because the random seed, Y , is uniformly distributed over r0, 1q, Eq. (21) follows
directly from the learner strategy’s being pε, νq-accurate:
ν ě P
´ pJ ‰ Jpε,X˚q¯ “ 1{δÿ
j“1
ż
1
0
PpEj,yqP
´ pJ ‰ Jpε,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,y¯ dy “ 1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
ξj,y dy.
(23)
We now show Eq. (20). Fix j P t1, . . . , 1{δu, and y P r0, 1q. We begin by
making the simple observation that, conditional on Ej,y, the subset of queries Q
j
together with their responses Rj is sufficient for generating the learner’s estimator,pJ , because under this conditioning, any query that lies outside the sub-interval
Mδpjq provides no additional information about the location of X˚ than what is
already known. Furthermore, since the random seed Y is fixed to y, the ith query,
Qi, is a deterministic function of the first i´ 1 responses. We conclude that the set
of responses Rj alone is sufficient for generating pJ .
For an event, E , we will denote by HpA|B, Eq the conditional entropy HpA ˇˇBq
under the probability law Pp¨|Eq:
HpA|B, Eq △“ ´
ÿ
aPA,bPB
PpA “ a,B “ b ˇˇ Eq log `PpA “ a ˇˇB “ b, Eq˘ , (24)
where A and B are the alphabets for random variables A and B, respectively. Sim-
ilarly, define
HpA ˇˇ Eq △“ ´ ÿ
aPA
PpA “ a ˇˇ Eq log `PpA “ a ˇˇ Eq˘ . (25)
Let V P t0, 1un be the vector representation of Rj :
Vi “ the ith element of Rj , i “ 1, 2, . . . , |Qj |, (26)
and Vi “ 1 for all i “ |Qj |, |Qj | ` 1, . . . , n. The conditional entropy of V given Ej,y
satisfies:
H
`
V
ˇˇ
Ej,y
˘ “ nÿ
k“1
H
`
V
ˇˇ
Ej,y, |Qj | “ k
˘
P
`|Qj | “ k ˇˇ Ej,y˘
ď
nÿ
k“1
kP
`|Qj | “ k ˇˇ Ej,y˘
“E `|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ , (27)
where the inequality follows from the fact that, conditional on there being k re-
sponses in Rj, we know that only the first k bits of V can be random, and hence the
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entropy of V cannot exceed k, which is the entropy of a length-k vector where each
entry is an independent Bernoulli random variable with mean 1{2. We now invoke
the following lemma by Robert Fano (cf. Section 2.1 of Cover and Thomas (2006)).
Lemma 2 (Fano’s Inequality) Let A and B be two random variables, where A
takes values in a finite set, A. Let pA be a discrete random variable taking values
in A, such that pA “ fpB,Cq, where f is a deterministic function, and C a random
variable independent from both A and B. Let p “ Pp pA ‰ Aq. We have that
H
`
A
ˇˇ
B
˘ ď hppq ` p plog |A| ´ 1q , (28)
where HpA ˇˇBq is the conditional entropy of A given B.
We apply Fano’s inequality with the substitutions: AÐ Jpε,X˚q, B Ð V , andpAÐ pJ . Eq. (28) yields
H
`
Jpε,X˚q ˇˇV, Ej,y˘ ď hpξj,yq ` ξj,y logpδ{εq, (29)
where we have used the fact that, conditional on the event Ej,y, the index Jpε,X˚q
can take at most δ{ε values. By the chain rule of conditional entropy, we have that
H
`
Jpε,X˚q ˇˇV, Ej,y˘ “H `Jpε,X˚q, V ˇˇ Ej,y˘´H `V ˇˇ Ej,y˘
ěH `Jpε,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,y˘´H `V ˇˇ Ej,y˘
paq“ logpδ{εq ´H `V ˇˇ Ej,y˘
pbq
ě logpδ{εq ´ E `|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ , (30)
where step paq follows from the fact that conditional on Ej,y, Jpε,X˚q is uniformly
distributed over δ{ε possible values, and step pbq follows from Eq. (27). Combining
Eqs. (29) and (30) yields
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ ě logpδ{εq ´H `Jpε,X˚q ˇˇV, Ej,y˘
ě logpδ{εq ´ phpξj,yq ` ξj,y logpδ{εqq
“p1´ ξj,yq logpδ{εq ´ hpξj,yq. (31)
This proves Lemma 1. ˝.
7.3 Proportional-Sampling Estimator
We now use the local complexity result in Lemma 1 to complete the proof of Propo-
sition 2. The lemma states that if the target were to lie in a given sub-interval in
the δ-uniform partition, then an accurate learner strategy would have to place at
least logpδ{εq queries within the said sub-interval on average. A naive approach to
using the lemma would let the adversary’s estimator select a sub-interval among
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those in Mδ that contain approximately logpδ{εq queries, with the hope that the
learner would have to induce L such sub-intervals to ensure privacy. However, for
this estimator to be a credible threat, the local complexity lower bound needs to
hold with almost certainty, instead of merely on average. Unfortunately, it may
not be possible to strengthen the lower bound to holding with certainty in general.
For instance, it is easy to see that the learner could “guess” the target’s location
with only two queries, at the expense of possibly increasing the average number of
queries overall. This suggests that forcing the number of queries to concentrate at,
or above, logpδ{εq under an arbitrary learner strategy is likely very difficult, if not
impossible.
Nevertheless, we are still able to take advantage of the average local complexity
in Lemma 1, but with a more robust adversary estimator. We will focus on a family
of proportional-sampling estimators for the adversary. Despite their simplicity, these
estimators prove to be sufficiently powerful against any learner strategy that uses a
“small” number of queries.
Definition 7 A proportional-sampling estimator, pJa, is generated according to the
distribution:
P
´ pJa “ j¯ “ |Qj |ř1{δ
j1“1 |Qj1 |
, j “ 1, 2, . . . , 1{δ. (32)
That is, an index is sampled with a probability proportional to the number of queries
that fall within the corresponding sub-interval in the δ-uniform partition.
We next bound the probability of correct estimation when the adversary employs
a proportional-sampling estimator: for all j “ 1, 2, . . . , 1{δ, we have that
P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,y¯ “P´ pJa “ j ˇˇ Ej,y¯
“E
¨˝
|Qj |ř1{δ
j1“1 |Qj1 |
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ Ej,y‚˛
paq“ 1
n
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘
pbq
ě 1
n
pp1´ ξj,yq logpδ{εq ´ hpξj,yqq , (33)
where step paq follows from the fact that φD P ΦDn , and hence
ř1{δ
j1“1 |Qj
1 | “ n, and
step pbq from Lemma 1. Recall that the learner strategy is pε, νq-private, and the
random seed Y has a probability density of 1 in r0, 1q and zero everywhere else.
Since Eq. (33) holds for all j and y, we can integrate and obtain the adversary’s
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overall probability of correct estimation:
P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q¯ “ 1{δÿ
j“1
ż
1
0
PpEj,yqP
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,y¯ dy
paq
ě 1
n
1{δÿ
j“1
ż
1
0
δ rp1´ ξj,yq logpδ{εq ´ hpξj,yqs dy
“ 1
n
»–¨˝1´ 1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
ξj,y dy‚˛logpδ{εq ´ 1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
hpξj,yq dy
fifl
pbq
ě 1
n
»–p1´ νq logpδ{εq ´ 1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
hpξj,yq dy
fifl
pcq
ě 1
n
»–p1´ νq logpδ{εq ´ h
¨˝
1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
ξj,y dy‚˛
fifl
pdq
ě 1
n
rp1´ νq logpδ{εq ´ hpνqs , (34)
where step paq follows from Eq. (33), steps pbq and pdq from Eq. (21) of Lemma 1,
i.e.,
1{δÿ
j“1
δ
ż
1
0
ξi,y dy ď ν. (35)
Step pcq is a result of Jensen’s inequality and the Bernoulli entropy function hp¨q’s
being concave.
Recall that, in order for a learner strategy to be pδ, Lq-private, we must have
that P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q¯ ď 1
L
for any adversary estimator pJa. Eq. (34) thus implies
that
n ě L rp1´ νq logpδ{εq ´ hpνqs , (36)
is necessary. Because this holds for any accurate and private learner policy, we have
thus proven Proposition 2.
7.4 From Discrete to Continuous Strategies
We now connect Proposition 2 to the original continuous estimation problem. The
next proposition is the main result of this subsection. The core of the proof is
a reduction that constructs a pβε, β´1q-accurate and pδ, Lq-private discrete learner
strategy from an ε-accurate and pδ, Lq-private continuous learner strategy.
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Proposition 3 Fix ε and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L.
Fix β P r2 , δ{εs.4 We have that
Npε, δ, Lq ě NDpβε, β´1, δ, Lq. (37)
Proof.Fix n P N and a continuous learner strategy, φ P Φn, such that φ is both
ε-accurate and pδ, Lq-private. Let pX the estimator of φ. It suffices to show that
there exists a function f : r0, 1q Ñ Mβε, such that by using the same queries as
φ, and setting pJ “ fp pXq we obtain a pβε, β´1q-accurate and pδ, Lq-private discrete
learner strategy. Specifically, let φD be the discrete learner strategy that submits
the same queries as φ, and produces the estimator
pJ “ Jpβε, pXq. (38)
That is, pJ reports the index of the sub-interval in the βε-uniform partition that
contains the continuous estimator, pX .
We first show that the induced discrete learner strategy is pβε, β´1q-private.
The intuition is that if the target X˚ is sufficiently far away from the edges of the
sub-interval in the pβεq-uniform partition to which it belongs, then both X˚ andpX will belong to the same sub-interval, and we will have Jpβε, pXq “ Jpβε,X˚q.
To make this precise, denote by Gβε the set of end points of the sub-intervals in
the pβεq-uniform partition: Gβε △“ t0, βε, 2βε, . . . , 1´ βε, 1u. Let S be the set of all
points in r0, 1q whose distance to Gβε is greater than ε{2:
S “ tx P r0, 1q : min
yPGβε
|x´ y| ą ε{2u. (39)
It is not difficult to show that the Lebesgue measure of S satisfies µLpSq “ ε{pβεq “
β´1, where ε is the length of the intersection of S with each of the pβεq´1 sub-
intervals in a pβεq-partition. Since φ is ε-accurate, we know that pX must be no
more than ε{2 away from X˚, and hence pJ “ J pβε,X˚q whenever X˚ R S, which
implies
P
´ pJ ‰ J pβε,X˚q¯ ď P pX˚ P Sq “ µLpSq “ β´1. (40)
This shows that φD is pβε, β´1q-accurate.
We next show that φD is also pδ, Lq-private. For the sake of contradiction,
suppose otherwise. Then, there exists an estimator for the adversary, pJa, such that
P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q¯ ą 1{L. (41)
4To avoid the use of rounding in our notation, we will assume that δ is an integer multiple of
βε.
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We now use pJa to construct a “good” adversary estimator for the continuous version:
let pXa be the mid point of the sub-interval Mδp pJaq, where Mδpjq is the jth sub-
interval in the δ-uniform partition. If pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q, then Mδpjq contains X˚, and
since the length of Mδpjq is δ, we must have
ˇˇˇ pXa ´X˚ ˇˇˇ ď δ{2, and from Eq. (41),
this implies
P
´ˇˇˇ pXa ´X˚ ˇˇˇ ď δ{2¯ ą 1{L. (42)
We therefore conclude that if an estimator satisfying Eq. (41) did exist, then the
original continuous learner strategy, φ, could not have been pδ, εq-private, which
leads to a contradiction. We have thus shown that φD is pβε, β´1q-accurate and
pδ, Lq-private. Because φD uses the same sequence of queries as φ, we conclude that
Npε, δ, Lq ě NDpβε, β´1, δ, Lq. This proves Proposition 3. ˝
7.4.1 Completing the Proof of the Lower Bound
We are now ready to establish the query complexity lower bound in Theorem 1. Fix
ε and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L. Using Propositions 2
and 3, we have that for any β P r2, δ{εs,
Npε, δ, Lq ěNDpβε, β´1, δ, Lq
pbq
ě L
„
p1´ β´1q log
ˆ
δ
ε
β´1
˙
´ hpβ´1q

, (43)
where the last step follows from Proposition 2 by substituting ν with β´1 and ε
with βε. Letting γ
△“ β´1, the above inequality can be rearranged to become
Npε, δ, Lq
L
ěp1´ γq log
ˆ
δ
ε
γ
˙
´ hpγq
paq
ěp1´ γq log
ˆ
δ
ε
γ
˙
` 2p1´ γq logpγq
“ logpδ{εq ´ γ logpδ{εq ` 3p1´ γq log γ
ě logpδ{εq ´ γ logpδ{εq ` 3 log γ, (44)
where step paq follows from the assumption that γ “ β´1 ď 1{2, and the fact that
hpxq ď ´2p1´ xq logpxq for all x P p0, 1{2s. Consider the choice:
β “ logpδ{εq. (45)
To verify β still belongs to the range r2, δ{εs, note that the assumption that ε ă δ{4
ensures β ě 2, and because x ą logpxq for all x ą 0, we have that β ă δ{ε.
Substituting γ with plogpδ{εqq´1 in Eq. (44), we have that
Npε, δ, Lq
L
ě logpδ{εq ´ 1´ 3 log logpδ{εq (46)
or, equivalently, Npε, δ, Lq ě L logp1{εq´L logp2{δq´3L log logpδ{εq. This completes
the proof of the lower bound in Theorem 1.
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8 Generalizations
The aim of the present section is to explore the generality of the our proof tech-
nique by extending the main result, Theorem 1, to two variants of the original
model. Before delving into the technical development, we will take a closer look at
the workhorse behind the lower bound proof, namely, the proportional-sampling es-
timators, in order to better understand what features of an active learning problem
make its privatization especially costly in terms of query complexity.
8.1 Action-Information Proximity
As was alluded to in Section 5, the proportional-sampling estimator’s efficacy stems
from the fact that, in order to accurately locate the target, a large number of the
queries must be spatially close to the said target. This means that the learner is
essentially forced to devote a substantial number of queries in multiple, separate
locations, such as is the case with the Replicated Bisection strategy in Section 6.
Otherwise, a disproportionally large fraction of the queries will concentrate around
the target, thus exposing the learner to the sort of attacks from a proportional-
sampling estimator that exploit the queries’ non-uniform spatial arrangement.
Extending the above ideas further, we see that the culprit in the learner’s plight
is a strong co-location of actions (e.g., queries) and information (e.g., location of
target), to be dubbed action-information proximity : queries only reveal information
when the target is situated nearby, and far-away queries provide little, if any, hint
about the target’s precise location. We may postulate that, in general, privacy will
come at a steep cost in those learning problems where:
1. Learning requires a large number of actions, regardless of the level of privacy.
(This requirement corresponds to the local complexity result of Lemma 1 in
our problem.)
2. According to some metric of distance, far-away actions are essentially uninfor-
mative.
If both conditions hold, then whenever the learner uses relatively few learning ac-
tions, these actions are likely forced to correlate with, and thus compromise, the
very information that the learner would like to conceal.
In the remainder of this section, we will explore the applicability of the concept of
action-information proximity by studying two generalizations of the original model.
In the first, we consider a high-dimensional version of Bayesian Private Learning,
where the target lies in a d-dimensional cube and the queries correspond to affine hy-
perplanes. Unlike in one dimension, a single query can now solicit information from
multiple regions within the unit cube, and thus weakening the action-information
proximity. In the second variant, we ask what happens when the adversary only has
partial observations of the queries. The partial observation assumption indirectly
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weakens the link between action and information, because a query that would have
been revealing about the target may not be fully observed by the adversary. We will
see that the proof techniques developed in the proceeding sections can still provide
non-trivial characterizations of query complexity. Unfortunately, these character-
izations will be weaker compared to those in Theorem 1, possibly a result of the
weakened action-information proximity.
8.2 High-Dimensional Linear Queries
We consider in this subsection a high-dimensional generalization of the one-dimensional
Bayesian Private Learning in Section 1. Fix d P N. Let the target, X˚ “ pX˚p1q, . . . ,X˚pdqq,
be a point distributed uniformly at random in the d-dimensional cube r0, 1qd. A
learner in search of X˚ is allowed to submit vector-valued queries, where
Qi “ pQip1q, . . . , Qipd` 1qq Ă Rd, (47)
for which she will receive the response
Ri “ I p〈Qip1 : dq,X˚〉 ď Qipd` 1qq , (48)
where Qip1 : dq △“ pQip1q, . . . , Qipdqq and 〈Qip1 : dq,X˚〉 denotes the inner productřd
k“1QipkqX˚pkq. In simple terms, the binary response corresponds whether or
not the target lies on the one side of the affine hyperplane associated with Qi.
Analogous to the original formulation, a learner strategy is ε-accurate if it is capable
of producing an estimator pX such that
Pp} pX ´X˚}8 ď ε{2q “ 1, (49)
where } ¨ }8 denotes the L8 norm: }x}8 “ max1ďkďd |xk|. The notion of pδ, Lq-
privacy is similarly defined, by replacing the absolute value in Definition 3 with the
} ¨ }8 norm. Note that, this formulation is more general than the one-dimensional
model, which can be recovered by setting d “ 1 and Qip1q “ 1.
We have the following generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Query Complexity of Private Learning with Hyperplanes) Fix
d P N, d ě 2. There exists a constant δ1 ą 0, such that whenever L ě 2d ^ 1{δ1,
δ ă L´1{d and ε P p0, δ{p2dqq, the following is true:5
1. Upper bound:
Npε, δ, Lq ď dL logp1{εq ´ L logL` dL1{d ď dL logp1{εq ´ LplogL´ 1q. (50)
5Note that here we require L ě 2d. This is due to a natural extension of the Replicated Bisection
strategy where we partition the d-dimensional unit cube into L equal-size cubes. In order for such a
partition to be well defined, L1{d needs to be an integer greater than or equal to 2. It is possible to
remove such a requirement on L in the upper bound by using an agent strategy that only privatize
along one dimension of the problem. However, that scheme will incur a higher query complexity
for large L and also demand a stricter requirement for δ to be at most 1{L, instead of L´1{d.
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2. Lower bound:6
Npε, δ, Lq ě c1δd´1L logpδ{εq ´ c2L, (51)
where c1, c2 are constants that can depend on d but not other parameters.
Zooming in on the regime where ε is small compared to other parameters, we obtain
the following corollary of Theorem 2.
Corollary 2 Fix d P N, d ě 2. Suppose we have that L ě 2d^1{δ1 and δ ă 1{L1{d,
where δ1 is defined in Theorem 2. Then, there exist positive constants c
1 and ε1,
such that
c1L logp1{εq ď Npε, δ, Lq ď dL logp1{εq, for all ε P p0, ε1q. (52)
The constants c1 and ε1 can depend on d and δ but not other parameters.
Comparing Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 to their one-dimensional counterparts in
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1, we notice that both the upper and lower bounds have
become weaker as a result of an increase in dimensionality. Nevertheless, we have
been able to retain the same multiplicative dependence on the level of privacy, L,
suggesting that it is a fundamental property of the problem, independent of the
dimensionality. The new lower bound is non-trivial since, as we discuss in the proof
that follows, the increase in dimensionality makes the task of the adversary more
difficult, and as such, the one-dimensional lower bound derived in Theorem 1 does
not apply.
We now prove Theorem 2. Throughout this section, when appropriate, we will
refer to earlier proof arguments to avoid repetition and instead focus on highlight-
ing the modifications. We begin with the query complexity upper bound. Since
an accurate learner strategy must be able to achieve a small error along each of
the d coordinates of X˚, a natural generalization of the bisection search strategy
would simply conduct a separate search in each dimension, k “ 1, . . . , d, by set-
ting Qipd ` 1q equal to the location of the query that corresponds to the bisection
search along the kth coordinate, Qipkq “ 1, and Qipjq “ 0 for all j ‰ k or d ` 1.
With logp1{εq queries per coordinate, this leads to a total of d logp1{εq queries. We
can generalize the Replicated Bisection strategy of Section 6 in a similar manner.
For s P p0, 1q such that s´1 P N, define the d-dimensional s-uniform partition,
Ms “ tMspl1, . . . , ldqupl1,...,ldqPt1,...,s´1ud , where Mspl1, . . . , ldq is the cube:
Mspl1, . . . , ldq “ rpl1 ´ 1qs , l1sq ˆ ¨ ¨ ¨ ˆ rpld ´ 1qs, ldsq. (53)
We will refer to Mspl1, . . . , ldq as a sub-cube of the partition. To implement the
Replicated Bisection strategy with privacy level L, we will need to create L sub-
cubes, and this corresponds to a L1{d-uniform partition of the unit cube, ML´1{d ,
6 Using an argument similar to that in Lemma 1, it can be shown that Npε, δ, Lq must also be
on the order of at least d logp1{εq, which corresponds to the (non-private) query complexity when
L “ 1. Unfortunately, retaining the joint multiplicative dependence on both d and L in the lower
bound proves to be challenging.
24
where each sub-cube has an edge length of L´
1
d . In Phase 1, the learner submits
dL1{d deterministic queries to find out which sub-cube within ML´1{d contains the
target, where the queries take the form
pQip1q, . . . , Qipdqq “ ek, Qipd` 1q “ L´1{dj, j “ 0, 1, . . . L1{d ´ 1, k “ 1, . . . , d,
(54)
where ek is the dˆ 1 vector with 1 in the kth coordinate, and 0 everywhere else. In
Phase 2, the learner conducts a copy of a bisection search in each of the L sub-cubes
of ML´1{d , over d logpL´1{d{εq rounds. Using essentially the same argument as that
in Section 6, we can show that the strategy is accurate and private, yielding the
query complexity upper bound:
Npε, δ, Lq ďLd logpL´1{d{εq ` dL1{d
“dL logp1{εq ´ L logL` dL1{d
ďdL logp1{εq ´ LplogL´ 1q. (55)
whenever ε ă δ ă L´1{d. The last step follows from the fact that dL1{d ď L for all
L ě 2d. Note that the above upper bound is similar to that in Theorem 1, with the
addition of a factor d in the first term reflecting the impact of dimensionality.
We now turn to the query complexity lower bound, by following the same four-
step procedure in Section 7. There is, however, a crucial difference to be reckoned
with: in the original version of the problem, a query can only intersect a single
sub-interval in an s-uniform partition, a feature that is crucial to the effectiveness
of the proportional-sampling estimator. This is no longer true when d ě 2, because
a hyperplane can intersect a large number of sub-cubes in Ms. That is, a single
query could potentially reveal information concerning multiple sub-regions of the
unit cube. The strong action-information proximity in the original problem is thus
weakened, suggesting that the learner might fare better than in the one-dimensional
setting.
Steps 1 and 2: Discrete Formulation and Localized Complexity. The discrete
version of the problem is essentially identical to that of the one-dimensional setting,
except that we will use the more general definition of the d-dimensional s-uniform
partition, Ms (Eq. (53)). Define by Vs the index set for Ms:
Vs
△“ tpl1, . . . , ldq P t1, . . . , s´1udu, (56)
and by Qj the set of queries whose corresponding hyperplane intersects with the jth
element of Mδ:
Qj
△“ tQi : Dx PMδpjq s.t. 〈x,Qip1 : dq〉 “ Qipd` 1qu, j P Vs. (57)
We have the following localized query complexity lower bound that mirrors Lemma
1. Note that the only difference is the additional factor of d in Eq. (59), due to the
increase in entropy.
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Lemma 3 (d-Dimensional Localized Query Complexity) Fix ε, ν and δ P
p0, 1q, ε ă δ, and an pε, νq-accurate discrete learner strategy. We have that
ÿ
jPVδ
δ
ż
1
0
ξi,y dy ď ν. (58)
and
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Jpδ,X˚q “ j, Y “ y˘ ě p1´ ξj,yqd logpδ{εq ´ hpξj,yq, (59)
for all j P Vδ, and y P r0, 1q.
The proof of Lemma 3 is essentially identical to that of Lemma 1, except for that
a sub-interval now becomes a sub-cube, and hence the conditional entropy of the
index, Jpε,Xq, given the target being inMδpjq increases to d logpδ{εq from logpδ{εq.
Step 3: Proportional Sampling. We now turn to the analysis of the proportional-
sampling estimator, and it is in this portion of the proof that we will see the most
significant departure as a result of dimensionality increase. Under a proportional-
sampling estimator, the adversary generates pJa by sampling an index proportional
to |Qj |, j P Vδ. Crucially, for j P V, the equation analogous to Eq. (33) is now:
Pp pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,yq “ E
˜
|Qj |ř
j1PVδ
|Qj1|
ˇˇˇ
Ej,y
¸
. (60)
Whereas we had
ř
j1PVδ
|Qj1 | “ n when d “ 1, this is no longer true when d ě 2, since
the hyperplane associated with a single query can intersect a large number of sub-
cubes. The following lemma characterizes the transversality of pd´ 1q-dimensional
hyperplanes, showing that |Q|j can be on the order of Opδ´pd´1qq. The proof is
based on basic properties of high-dimensional geometry, and is given in Appendix
A.2.
Lemma 4 (Hyperplane Transversality) Fix d P N. Denote by H a hyperplane
in Rd, and denote by NH the number of sub-cubes in Mδ that intersect H. The
following is true.
1. For all H,
NH ď gd
`
δ´1 ` 1˘d´1 , δ P p0, 1q, (61)
where gd “ pi d2 d
d`1
2 {Γ `d`1
2
˘
and Γp¨q is the gamma function. In other words,
there exist positive constants cd and δd, such that NH ď cdδ´pd´1q, for all
δ P p0, δdq.
2. Conversely, there exists an H such that NH ě δ´pd´1q.
26
Lemma 4 shows that the denominator in Eq. (60) can be on the order of
Opnδ´pd´1qq, suggesting that, as the dimension increases, the action-information
proximity may drop dramatically and the effectiveness of the proportional-sampling
estimator weakened as a result. By combining Eq. (60) and Lemma 4, we obtain the
following analog of Proposition 2 on the query complexity of the discrete problem:
Proposition 4 Let cd be δd be the positive constants defined in Lemma 4. Fix ε, ν
and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ ă 1{L ă δd. We have that
NDpε, ν, δ, Lq ě c´1d δd´1L rp1´ νqd logpδ{εq ´ hpνqs , (62)
where hppq is the Shannon entropy of a Bernoulli random variable with mean p.
Step 4: Connecting to the Continuous Version. To derive an analog of Propo-
sition 3, the only adjustment we need to make is to re-calculate the probability of
error when convertings a continuous learner strategy into a discrete one. Specifically,
keeping all other portions of the proof of Proposition 3 unchanged, the right-hand
side of Eq. (40) will change from β´1 to β´1d via a union bound across all d di-
mension. We obtain the following analog of Proposition 3, where the term β´1 is
replaced β´1d.
Proposition 5 Fix d P N. Fix ε and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{p2dq
and δ ă 1{L. Fix β ą 0, such that β P r2d, δ{εs. We have that
Npε, δ, Lq ě NDpβε, dβ´1, δ, Lq. (63)
To complete the analysis, define γ “ dβ´1, and Eq. (44) will be modified to become
Npε, δ, Lq
L
¨ 1
c´1d δ
d´1
ěp1´ γqd log
ˆ
δ
ε
γ
˙
´ hpγq
ěp1´ γqd log
ˆ
δ
ε
γ
˙
` 2p1 ´ γq logpγq
ěd logpδ{εq ´ γd logpδ{εq ` pd` 2q logpγq, (64)
whenever γ ď 1{2. Suppose that δ{ε ą 2d. Set γ “ 1{2 or, equivalently, β “ 2d.
We have that
Npε, δ, Lq ěc´1d δd´1L
„
d
2
logpδ{εq ´ pd` 2q

“cd,1δd´1L logpδ{εq ´ cd,2Lδd´1
ěcd,1δd´1L logpδ{εq ´ cd,2L, (65)
where cd,1 “ d2c´1d and cd,2 “ c´1d pd ` 2q, and the last inequality follows from the
fact that δ ă 1. This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
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8.3 Partial Adversary Observation
We now generalize the model along a different direction starting from the original
one-dimensional formulation in Section 1. We had initially assumed that the ad-
versary would observe all of the learner’s queries exactly, which can be a strong
assumption for practical purposes. In this subsection, we will analyze a general-
ization of the problem where the adversary is entitled to only partial observations.
Since the power of the adversary is not strengthened under partial observation,
any learner strategy and query complexity upper bound developed for the original,
stronger adversary model will continue to hold (though there might be room for
even better learner strategies), while it is conceivable that the query lower bound
will become much weaker under partial observation. Therefore, we will focus on the
query complexity lower bound in this subsection.
Formally, we will consider the following general partial observation model. Let
U be the set of possible observations, and fu : r0, 1qn`1 Ñ U an observation function
which maps the learner’s queries Q
△“ pQ1, . . . , Qnq and a random seed, Yu, into a
(possibly random) observation, U “ fupQ,Yuq in U . Here, Yu is a uniform random
variable in r0, 1q, independent from other parts of the system. The adversary knows
fu, but only sees the observation, U , instead of the queries, pQ1, . . . , Qnq.
The function fu thus captures any perturbation, noise, or compression embedded
in the adversary’s observation. The following definition characterizes the “quality”
of the observation function in terms of the extent to which the adversary can use
U to produce an unbiased estimator for the fraction of queries that lie in Mδpjq,
|Qj |{n.
Definition 8 (ζ-Biased Observation Function) Fix δ and ζ P p0, 1q. An obser-
vation function, fu, is ζ-biased, if under any learner strategy there exist estimators
t pN juj“1,...,1{δ which take as input U “ fupQ,Yuq and satisfy ř1{δj“1 pN j ď n, and
E
´ pN j ˇˇ Ej,y¯
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ ě 1´ ζ, (66)
for all j P t1, . . . , 1{δu such that E `|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ ą 0, where Ej,y △“ tJpδ,X˚q “ j, Y “
yu.
We now look at two examples of a partial observation model:
Example 1 : In an additive noise model, instead of knowing query Qi exactly,
the adversary observes Qi ` Zi, where Zi is an idiosyncratic Gaussian noise with
mean zero and variance σ2. Denote by Φp¨q the cumulative distribution function
of a standard normal distribution. Because the probability density function of the
normal distribution is symmetric and monotonically decreasing away from the origin,
it is not difficult to show that
PpQi`Zi PMδpjq|Qi PMδpjqq ě 1
2
´Φp´δ{σq, @j “ 1, . . . , 1{δ, i “ 1, . . . , n. (67)
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Set the estimator pN j to be the number of perturbed queries that fall within the jth
sub-interval ofMδ. Clearly, the definition implies that
ř1{δ
j“1
pN j “ n, and the above
equation implies
E
´ pN j ˇˇ Ej,y¯
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ ě E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ `12 ´ Φp´δ{σq˘
E
`|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ “ 12´Φp´δ{σq “ 1´
ˆ
1
2
` Φp´δ{σq
˙
.
(68)
Therefore, we conclude that the observation function associated with the additive
noise model is
`
1
2
` Φp´δ{σq˘-biased. Because limxÑ´8Φpxq “ 0, in the regime
where the magnitude of noise σ is substantially smaller than the adversary error
tolerance, ε, the observation function becomes essentially 1{2-biased.
Example 2 : In a random erasure model with erasure probability p, a query Qi
is observed exactly by the adversary with probability p, and is not observed at all
with probability 1 ´ p, where the event of an erasure is independent from the rest
of the system. Denote by N j the number of observed queries that fall within the
sub-interval Mδpjq, and consider the following estimator:
pN j “ 1
p
N j
n
1
p
ř1{δ
j1“1N
j1
. (69)
When n is small or p is large, pN j can be biased in the sense of Definition 8. How-
ever, if n is sufficiently large or p is sufficiently small, then the denominator in
the right-hand side of Eq. (69) will concentrate around n. Since N j{p is an un-
biased estimator for |Qj |, it is not difficult to show that in that regime, the ratio
E
´ pN j ˇˇ Ej,y¯{E `|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ will approach 1. Therefore, when n is large or p is small,
the observation function in the random erasure model is ζ-biased for a small ζ.
The following theorem is the main result of this subsection, which generalizes
the query complexity lower bound to the partial observation model.
Theorem 3 (Query Complexity Lower Bound under Partial Observation)
Fix ε and δ in p0, 1q and L P N, such that ε ă δ{4 and δ ă 1{L. Suppose that the
adversary’s observation function is ζ-biased for some ζ P p0, 1q. We have that
Npε, δ, Lq ě p1´ ζq pL logp1{εq ´ L logp2{δq ´ 3L log logpδ{εqq . (70)
We may, for instance, apply Theorem 3 to the additive noise model. Observe
that for any δ ą 0, there exists a σ0 ą 0, such that the observation function is 2{3-
biased for all σ P p0, σ0q (cf. Eq. (68)). Invoking Theorem 3, we have that, whenever
σ P p0, σ0q,
Npε, δ, Lq ě 1
3
pL logp1{εq ´ L logp2{δq ´ 3L log logpδ{εqq , (71)
To prove Theorem 3, we need only modify the proportional-sampling estimator of
Section 7.3. Fix a learner strategy in Φn, and let pN j be the estimators in Definition
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8. Consider the proportional sampling estimator in Definition 7, but rather than
sampling an index j with a probability proportional to |Qj |, let the index instead
be sampled with a probability proportional to pN j . With this mortification, we have
that
P
´ pJa “ Jpδ,X˚q ˇˇ Ej,y¯ “ E
¨˝ pN jř1{δ
j1“1
pN j1
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇˇ Ej,y‚˛paqě p1´ ζq 1nE `|Qj | ˇˇ Ej,y˘ , (72)
where step paq follows from the fact that the observation function is ζ-biased. Com-
paring Eq. (72) to the original Eq. (33), we notice that the only difference lies in the
additional constant factor p1´ ζq. It is not difficult verify that the rest of the proof
the original lower bound can be carried out in essentially an identical manner.
9 Concluding Remarks
The main result of the present paper is a tight query complexity lower bound for
the Bayesian Private Learning problem, which, together with an upper bound in
Tsitsiklis et al. (2018), shows that the learner’s query complexity depends multi-
plicatively on the level of privacy, L: if an ε-accurate learner wishes to ensure that
an adversary’s probability of making a δ-accurate estimation is at most 1{L, then
she needs to employ on the order of L logpδ{εq queries. Moreover, we show that the
multiplicative dependence on L holds even under the more general models of high-
dimensional queries and partial adversary observation. To prove the lower bound,
we develop a set of information-theoretic arguments which involve, as a main ingre-
dient, the analysis of proportional-sampling adversary estimators that exploit the
action-information proximity inherent in the learning problem. The present work
leaves open a few interesting directions:
The current upper and lower bounds are not tight in the regime where the
adversary’s error criterion, δ, is significantly smaller than 1{L. Making progress in
this regime is likely to require a more delicate argument and possibly new tools.
While we are able to extend the proof to the more general models in Section 8,
the query complexity bounds are no longer tight, partially because the proportional-
sampling estimators are not as effective under weakened action-information prox-
imity. It would be interesting to see whether the gap between the upper and lower
bounds can be shrunk by constructing more sophisticated learner strategy and ad-
versary estimators. For instance, in the high-dimensional linear query model, while
a query may intersect multiple sub-cubes, the sub-cube that contains the target is
likely to be associated with more concentrated intersections than those that do not.
This seems to suggest that the adversary might benefit by weighing the “suscepti-
bility” of the sub-cubes non-linearly as a function of the queries’ empirical densities,
instead of the linear weighing prescribed by the proportional-sampling estimators.
30
Our query model assumes that the responses to the learner’s queries are noise-
less, and it will be interesting to explore how may the presence of noisy responses
(Rivest et al., 1980; Ben-Or and Hassidim, 2008; Waeber et al., 2013) impact the
design of private query strategies. For instance, a natural generalization of the bi-
section search algorithm to the noisy setting is the Probabilistic Bisection Algorithm
(Horstein, 1963; Waeber et al., 2013), where the nth query point is the median of the
target’s posterior distribution in the nth time slot. It is conceivable that one may
construct a probabilistic query strategy analogous to the Replicated Bisection strat-
egy by replicating queries in L pre-determined sub-intervals. However, it appears
challenging to prove that such replications preserve privacy. Since noisy responses
weaken the power of the learner, the query complexity lower bound that we have
developed in Theorem 1 immediately extends to the noisy setting; it is however
unclear how this lower bound can be improved to match that of a private query
strategy.
One may also want to extend our analysis to more complex models of active
learning or online (convex) optimization. For instance, since the current model
corresponds to actively learning an threshold function via function-value queries
(see Remark 1), it would be interesting to know how to design private strategies
for learning richer functional classes (e.g., smooth convex functions). Alternatively,
one may also consider a model in which each query reveals to the learner the full
gradient of a function at the queried location, instead of only the sign of the gradient
as in the present model.
Finally, our present discussion of the action-information proximity is rather qual-
itative, and it would be desirable to formulate a precise and general framework to
articulate the action-information proximity in sequential learning problems, and
better understand how it relates to the cost of privacy.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Denote by Q˜l the query submitted in the lth sub-interval during the last
round of Phase 2 of the Replicated Bisection strategy. Note that since the positions
of the queries relative to their respective sub-interval are identical in each round,
we must have that
|Q˜l ´ Q˜l1 | ě 1
L
, @l, l1 Ă t1, . . . , Lu, l ‰ l1. (73)
By the end of the second phase, the adversary knows that the target belongs to
the sub-interval rQ˜l ´ ε, Q˜l ` εq for some l P t1, . . . , Lu, but not more than that.
Formally, it is not difficult to show that, almost surely, the posterior density of X˚
is
fX˚px|pQ1, . . . , Qnqq “ 1
2Lε
, @x P YLl“1rQ˜l ´ ε, Q˜` εq, (74)
and fX˚px|pQ1, . . . , Qnqq “ 0 everywhere else. Recall that ε ă δ and δ ă 1{L by
assumption, we have that
δ{2 ă ´ε` 1{L, (75)
where the right-hand side corresponds to the distance between two adjacent intervals
rQ˜l´ε, Q˜`εq. In light of Eq. (73), this implies that for any interval G Ă r0, 1q with
length δ,
µL
´
GX
´
YLl“1rQ˜l ´ ε, Q˜` εq
¯¯
ď 2ε, almost surely, (76)
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where µLp¨q is the Lebesgue measure. Combining the above inequality with Eq. (74),
we conclude that, for any adversary estimator pXa, generated based on Q, we have
P
´
| pXa ´X˚| ď δ{2 ˇˇ pQ1, . . . , Qnq¯ ď 1´ L´ 1
L
“ 1
L
, almost surely. (77)
This shows that the Replicated Bisection strategy is pδ, Lq-private. ˝
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The lower bound on NH follows from observing that the hyperplane H “
tpx1, . . . , xdq P Rd : x1 “ 0.5u, we have NH “ δ´pd´1q. We now prove the upper
bound. Denote by J H the indices of the sub-cubes in Mδ that intersect H, and by
H˜ the cross section of the unit cube along H:
H˜ “ H X r0, 1qd. (78)
Note that the diameter of a length-δ cube in d dimensions is equal to δ
?
d. Denote
by Bdpx, rq a d-dimensional ball centered at x with radius r. It thus follows that
YjPJH Mδpjq Ă pBdp0, δ
?
dq ` H˜q △“ H˜B , (79)
where the addition on the right-hand side denotes the Minkowski sum. This further
implies that
Vold
`YjPJHMδpjq˘ ď VoldpH˜Bq, (80)
where Voldp¨q represents the d-dimensional volume. Because the diameter of r0, 1qd
is
?
d, the cross section H˜ is contained by some pd´ 1q-ball with radius ?d{2. It is
not difficult to show that
VoldpH˜Bq “VoldpBdp0, δ
?
dq ` H˜q
ďVold´1
´
Bd´1
´
0, δ
?
d`
?
d{2
¯¯
δ
?
d
“ pi
d´1
2
Γ
`
d´1
2
` 1˘
´
δ
?
d`
?
d{2
¯d´1
δ
?
d (81)
where the inequality follows from the fact that Bdp0, δ
?
dq ` H˜ is contained in a
cylinder with radius δ
?
d`?d{2 and height δ?d. Because YjPJHMδpjq consists of
NH disjoint cubes with volume δ
d each, we have that
NH “
VoldpYjPJHMδpjqq
δd
ď VoldpH˜Bq
δd
ď pi
d´1
2
Γ
`
d´1
2
` 1˘
´
δ
?
d`
?
d{2
¯d´1?
dδd´1
ďpi
d
2 d
d`1
2
Γ
`
d`1
2
˘ `δ´1 ` 1˘d´1 . (82)
This proves the upper bound on NH . ˝
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B Replicated Bisection Search is not Differentially Pri-
vate
We highlight in this section the difference between the privacy framework consid-
ered in this paper (goal-oriented) and that of differential privacy (universal). We
will demonstrate that the Replicated Bisection strategy (Section 6), while private
according to our formulation, is never differentially private. The discussion in this
section is not meant to be very formal, but we will aim to elucidate the main idea
in a clear and analytical manner. Furthermore, there may be multiple ways to cast
our problem into the differential privacy framework, and we will choose one that
appears most natural.
We begin with a brief review of the basic concepts and terminology in differential
privacy (cf. Chapter 2 of Dwork et al. (2014)). Let U be an arbitrary set, and an
element u P U be called a (data) entry. Fix n P N. A vector consisting of data
entries, u¯ “ pu¯1, u¯2, . . . , u¯nq P Un, is called a database. For two databases u¯ and
u¯1 in Un, denote by d1pu¯, u¯1q the number of data entries that differ between them:
d1pu¯, u¯1q “
řn
i“1 Ipu¯i ‰ u¯1q. Let Y be a set of observations. Finally, a mechanism,
M : Un Ñ Y, is a (randomized) mapping from the space of databases to that of
observations.
Roughly speaking, differential privacy demands that the observationMpu¯q should
not reveal the nature of individual entries in the database, u¯. Specifically, if one
were to perturb one entry in a database, u¯, to create a second database, u¯1, then
the distributions ofMpu¯q andMpu¯1q should be “close” under an appropriate metric.
Formally, we have the following definition (e.g., Definition 2.4, Dwork et al. (2014)):
Definition 9 Fix n P N, δ P r0, 1q and ε P R`. A mechanism M is pε, δq-
differentially private if for all S Ă Y, and u¯ and u¯1 in Un such that d1pu¯, u¯1q “ 1,
we have
PpMpu¯q P Sq ď exppεqPpMpu¯1q P Sq ` δ, (83)
where the probability is measured with respect to the randomization in M .
For instance, a p0, 0q-differentially private mechanism will produce an identical out-
put distribution under any input database. More generally, a smaller value of ε and
δ means that the mechanism is more private.
We now cast our problem in the above framework.
1. Database: since the information that the learner wishes to conceal is the target,
X˚, a natural way to encode would be to express X˚ in its binary expansion
up to logp1{εq bits of precision (beyond which the learner will have no need to
discern). Let n “ logp1{εq, and let řni“1 u¯i2´i be the n-bit binary expansion
of X˚. The database of interest will therefore be u¯ “ pu¯1, . . . , u¯nq. We have
U “ t0, 1u and Un “ t0, 1un.
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2. Mechanism and Observations: the mechanism, M , in our case would be the
learner’s strategy. That is, M takes as input the database, u¯, and produces
as an observation the sequence of queries, pQiqi“1,...,N . We have Y “ r0, 1qN .
We now examine how the criterion of differential privacy relates to our notion
of privacy (Definition 3). In one direction, it is clear that there is a differentially
private mechanism (with sufficiently small ε and δ) that functions as a pδ, Lq-private
query strategy: simply look at the case where ε “ δ “ 0, in which case the strategy
would lead to the same distribution of queries regardless of what the true target is!
It is in the other direction that we see that differential privacy can be substan-
tially more restrictive. Let the mechanism M be associated with the Replicated
Bisection strategy (Section 6). For concreteness, consider the case of L “ 2, and
the learner strategy would conduct two identical copies of bisection search in the
sub-intervals r0, 1{2q and p1{2, 1q. Under this strategy, the adversary will know the
exact relative location of the target (up to ε error) with respect to each sub inter-
val, but does not know which of the two sub-interval contains the target. In other
words, M reveals all but the first bit of u¯, which encodes the identity of the “true”
sub-interval!7
From the above observation, we can deduce that the Replicated Bisection strat-
egy can never be differentially private: let u¯ be the all-zero vector, and u¯1 a vector
where all but the second bit is zero. That is, u¯ and u¯1 differ in the second bit, and
d1pu¯, u¯1q “ 1. Let S0 be the smallest subset of Y such that PpMpu¯q P S0q “ 1. In-
tuitively, S0 is the set of all “plausible” observations under u¯. Since the mechanism
always reveals the second bit of u¯, it follows that any observation that’s “plausible”
under u¯ must be “implausible” under u¯1. That is,
PpMpu¯1q P S0q “ 0. (84)
This shows that M is not pε, δq-differentially private for any non-trivial choice of ε
and δ (ε ą 0 and δ P p0, 1q). The same analysis extends easily to L ě 3, since, in
general, the mechanism associated with the Replicated Bisection strategy reveals all
but the first logL bits of the database.
More importantly, the above example also shows why differential privacy is more
restrictive. In differential privacy, the mechanism aims to conceal any (one-entry)
perturbation of the database. In contrast, the Replicated Bisection strategy has no
trouble giving away the less significant bits of the database, and is only concerned
with obfuscating perturbations in the leading bits of u¯ which would result in “large”
changes in the target’s location as measured by the L1 distance. In other words, a
goal-oriented notion of privacy naturally induces different degrees of “importance”
across data entries (bits), a key feature that is not captured by differential privacy,
who treats all data entries with equal importance.
7Technically, the adversary also does not know the very last bit of u¯. But this detail does not
alter our subsequent argument in any significant way, since all bits between the first and the last
will be known.
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